SpyEye changes phone numbers to hijack out of band SMS security
The Trusteer research team recently uncovered a stealth new attack carried out by the SpyEye Trojan that circumvents mobile SMS (short message service) security measures implemented by many banks.
Using code we captured while protecting a Rapport user, we discovered a two-step web-based attack that allows fraudsters to change the mobile phone number in a victim’s online banking account and reroute SMS confirmation codes used to verify online transactions. This attack, when successful, enables the thieves to make transactions on the user’s account and confirm the transactions without the user’s knowledge.
In the first step of the attack, SpyEye steals the victim’s online banking login details. This is standard operating procedure for financial malware like SpyEye, Zeus, and others. The fraudsters can now access the victim’s account without raising any red flags that would be picked up by fraud detection systems.
In Step 2, SpyEye changes the victim’s phone number of record in the online banking application to one of several random attacker controlled numbers. In order to complete this operation the attacker needs the confirmation code which is sent by the bank to the customer’s original phone number. To steal this confirmation code the attacker uses the following social engineering scheme.
First, SpyEye injects a fraudulent page in the customer’s browser that appears to be from the online banking application. The fake page purports to introduce a new security system that is now “required” by the bank and for which customers must register. The page explains that under this new security process the customer will be assigned a unique telephone number and that they will receive a special SIM card via mail. Next, the user is instructed to enter the personal confirmation number they receive on their mobile telephone into the fake web page in order to complete the registration process for the new security system. This allows the criminals to steal the confirmation code they need to authorize changing the customer’s mobile number.
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